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As nations’ markets continue to become more closely integrated through
the process commonly referred to as globalization, a concern has arisen both
popularly and among policy makers about the consequences for the degree
of competition between ﬁrms. Critics of globalization often charge that it ex-
tends the reach of abusive oligopolies and monopolies,1and policymakers in
developing countries worry whether or not increased openness to trade and
foreign-direct-investment ﬂows makes them more vulnerable to “exploita-
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1. See, for example, the following remarks by Mr. Martin Khor, Director of the Third
World Network, to the opening session of the UN”s Millennium Forum on 22 May 2000.
Our age is also deﬁned by the process of globalisation. There are diﬀerent approaches to
this phenomenon. Some say it is inevitable and basically good, you just have to adjust to it
and learn to reap the beneﬁts. Others worry about the costs and advocate some safety nets
to catch the losers as they fall. In truth, the essence of globalisation is the push by big com-
panies and ﬁnancial institutions to have more power, to grow bigger through taking over
others, and make more proﬁts. They have lobbied their governments, of the rich countries,
to break down the national barriers that prevent them from totally free access to markets
across the world, especially in the developing countries.
The text of this speech can be downloaded from http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/mk7.htm.tion” by multinational ﬁrms.2 Such policymakers wonder if they have—or
can ever have—the national tools to tackle private anticompetitive practices.3
There is also a vibrant debate about the potential for international ac-
cords on competition law and enforcement. Policymakers worldwide are
engaged in discussions about the desirability and viability of a multilateral
framework on competition policy under the auspices of the World Trade
Organization (WTO).4Proponents of such a framework have called for dis-
ciplines on so-called hard-core cartels, so-called core principles for com-
petition law and enforcement, modalities for voluntary cooperation, and
for the progressive strengthening of competition-policy-related institu-
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2. See, for example, the following statement in a November 1998 submission by the Gov-
ernment of India to the World Trade Organization’s Working Group on the Interaction Be-
tween Trade and Competition Policy.
In contributions of intergovernmental organizations, a dominant theme along with the is-
sue of mergers and acquisitions is the issue of contestability of markets. Although not
clearly deﬁned, an impression is created that every aspect of domestic government policy,
economic and social—would, in one way or the other, aﬀect fair trade and the contesta-
bility of markets. In a more concrete sense this debate on contestability of markets has been
witnessed during the so-called Structural Impediments Initiative in the US-Japan context.
With developing countries, the dangers of the doctrine of contestability of markets erod-
ing their ability to take domestic social and economic action are even greater. Moreover, in
the name of contestability, an increase in market access for MNCs [multinational corpo-
rations] may be sought by suggesting that all sectors of WTO, in one way or another, be put
to the test of contestability. This may have implications for services, intellectual property
rights, subsidies and a host of other areas, not to mention investment. It will, therefore, be
necessary to deﬁne it clearly and narrowly in relation to speciﬁc issues and disciplines that
we wish to address in the WTO regime. Some issues to be addressed would be market al-
location, refusal to deal (boycott), price ﬁxing, collusive dealing, and diﬀerential pricing
(all of which are vertical RBPs [restrictive business practices]). All of these practices dis-
tort or restrict trade and aﬀect the international contestability of markets. This action is
particularly called for as developing country markets and their commercial entities are
more vulnerable to the eﬀects of such RBPs and at their receiving end. Experiences with
RBPs encountered by developing country ﬁrms in developed country markets illustrate
how RBPs by the large MNCs put these ﬁrms at a competitive disadvantage. Instances of
other so-called privately led restrictive business practices such as debarring Indian partic-
ipation in the Dutch Flower Auction or the Basle Jewellery and Watch Fair are also rele-
vant.
This text was taken from paragraph two of WTO document number WT/WGTCP/W/111,
which can be downloaded from the WTO’s website (http://www.wto.org). See also the ex-
amples described in Mehta and Nanda (2003).
3. A recent study of the experience in implementing competition law in seven developing
countries oﬀered the following remark about the ability of these countries’ antitrust enforcers
to address international mergers and acquisitions and anticompetitive practices.
Whether countries have special provisions for extra-territorial jurisdiction or apply the
“eﬀects” doctrine is not important when they have no means to enforce their decisions. Of-
ten the companies involved are beyond the reach of the competition agencies, which also
causes problems in obtaining the information necessary to make a decision. (Consumer
Union Trust Society [CUTS] 2003, 75)
4. For an excellent overview of the discussions within the WTO’s Working Group on the In-
teraction Between Trade and Competition Policy, see that Working Group’s Annual Report
for 2002 (WTO 2002).tions in developing countries.5 Others argue for the development of best
practices for competition law and enforcement in fora such as the Interna-
tional Competition Network and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD).6 And, others have called on indus-
trialized economies to tackle the alleged anticompetitive practices of their
multinational ﬁrms in developing economies. This proposal would involve
antitrust enforcement oﬃcials expanding their traditional concern about
harm done within their jurisdiction to harm done abroad. It is argued that
such an approach would reduce the outlays on antitrust enforcement by
developing economies.7
In principle, integrating national markets both reduces and enhances
the opportunities and viability of anticompetitive conduct by private ﬁrms.
On the one hand, as countries open up their domestic markets to foreign
competition by reducing their tariﬀs and other trade-distorting policies,
domestic incumbents that have been protected from international compe-
tition by these trade barriers are now more likely to be forced to abandon
their price-raising and anticompetitive practices.8 Moreover, the increased
opportunities for international mergers and acquisitions can bring cost-
reducing eﬃciencies that may be passed on to customers, be they private
consumers, ﬁrms, or governments. On the other hand, globalization also
presents new opportunities for ﬁrms to form hard-core cartels9 with inter-
national reach and other various anticompetitive arrangements. Thus,
whether globalization promotes or reduces competitive behavior, on bal-
ance, is largely an empirical rather than theoretical issue.
In this chapter, I ﬁrst describe in considerable detail the nature of the
wave of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) that occurred dur-
ing the period of rapid globalization in the 1990s and then focus on one
particular service sector, namely banking, to investigate if there is evidence
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5. The European Commission is one of the leading proponents of such a framework. Its
proposals can be downloaded from the WTO’s website (http://www.wto.org). The Commis-
sion has further clariﬁed its proposals in discussions at the WTO’s Working Group (see WTO
2002). The doubts of critics and skeptics are also reported in WTO (2002). For an analysis of
the implications of such a framework for the design and implementation of national compe-
tition law, for industrial policy and development policy options, and for the resource costs
faced by developing countries, see Evenett (2003a).
6. For several proposals on best practices in the merger-enforcement area, see the contri-
butions to Rowley (2002). More generally, discussions on best practices in competition law
and enforcement are undertaken often in the OECD’s Competition Committee. Many of the
relevant documents can be found at http://www.oecd.org/EN/document/0,,EN-document-
768-nodirectorate-no-22-20233-768,00.html. A number of interesting and informative docu-
ments on best practices in merger review can be found on the website of the mergers working
group of the International Competition network (http://www.internationalcompetitionnet-
work.org/wg1.html).
7. See Hoekman and Mavroidis (2002).
8. For a classic statement of this perspective, see Bhagwati (1968).
9. For evidence on private international cartels see Evenett (2003a), Levenstein and Suslow
(2001), and OECD (2003).that cross-border M&A in this industry resulted in greater spreads between
the interest rates paid by borrowers and those rates paid to depositors. Of
course, there are limits to what can be learned from a single sector study,
but hopefully this analysis will contribute to the factual record and to the
literature on consolidation in the banking sector, as well as shedding light
on the importance of a number of factors that should be considered when
coming to a view on the welfare consequences of the latest wave of cross-
border mergers and acquisitions.
My analysis yields several ﬁndings. First, the recent cross-border M&A
wave is in real terms at least ﬁve times larger than its predecessor in the
1980s. Even after correcting for the rising price of ﬁnancial assets,10 in this
latest wave of cross-border M&A is much much larger. Second, although
the latest wave involved ﬁrms from more countries than in the 1980s, the
overwhelming bulk of such M&A still took place among the members of
the OECD. Third, despite its greater scale in real terms, the latest wave
of cross-border M&A represents purchases of only a small fraction of the
publicly traded corporate assets in industrial economies, especially in the
Group of Seven (G7) leading industrial economies. Foreigners are, there-
fore, not taking over large tranches of national economies through cross-
border M&A. Fourth, the preponderance of cross-border M&A in the late
1990s were in service sectors, many of which are pretty much immune to
import competition.
Fifth, in one important service sector—banking—estimating the eﬀects
of cross-border mergers and acquisitions requires paying careful attention
to sample composition. Furthermore, controlling for changes in regula-
tory regimes and other changes in market structure in banking are impor-
tant. Of the thirteen OECD nations’ banking sectors considered here, eight
are members of the European Union (EU). The determinants of the latters’
banking spreads during the 1990s are found to be much diﬀerent from
those in non-EU economies. In the banking sectors of EU member states,
domestic M&A and strategic alliances are found to have no net eﬀect on
bank spreads. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions are found to depress
spreads, suggesting that substantial eﬃciencies resulted from such consol-
idation. In contrast, the evidence suggests that cross-border strategic al-
liances result in higher spreads—a ﬁnding that is consistent with the view
that some such alliances have been formed to forestall further market inte-
gration and to preserve the independence of banks in Europe.
The parameters in the non-EU sample are less precisely estimated, re-
ﬂecting in large part a smaller number of observations. Only cross-border
strategic alliances are found to inﬂuence bank spreads in a statistically sig-
niﬁcant manner—in this case depressing them (which is the opposite of my
ﬁnding in the EU sample). Nevertheless, taken together, this chapter’s re-
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10. As proxied for by national stock-market indexes, see following discussion.sults for the banking section imply that it is hazardous to make sweeping
generalizations about the net eﬀect of cross-border transactions, especially
as the latter can have both procompetitive and anticompetitive eﬀects.
Sixth, the estimated parameters are used to forecast the net eﬀect of all
of these domestic and cross-border interﬁrm agreements on bank spreads
in each of the thirteen countries considered in my EU and non-EU
samples. In each EU member state, the combined eﬀect of cross-border in-
terﬁrm agreements on interest-rate spreads is an order of magnitude larger
than for domestic interﬁrm agreements. Moreover, the overall beneﬁcial
eﬀect of cross-border M&A in banking11 in the EU has, in all of the eight
EU members considered here, been completely reversed by the harm done
by cross-border strategic alliances. This implies that the combined eﬀect of
the latter may not be as benign or as inconsequential as they ﬁrst appear.12
Moreover, as the number of cross-border strategic alliances in banking
in the EU appears to have increased considerably after the cross-border
M&A spurt began, my ﬁndings are consistent with the explanation that
banks eventually took rearguard actions to increase their market power af-
ter the spread-reducing eﬀects of eﬃciency-enhancing cross-border merg-
ers and acquisitions were felt. If this view is correct, then regulators in the
banking sector and competition policy oﬃcials should not focus solely on
the potential consequences of mergers and acquisitions and should keep a
beady eye on perhaps more innocent-looking public announcements of
strategic alliances.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the recent
wave of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The third section focuses
on the consolidation in the banking systems in thirteen industrialized
economies, establishing the factual record ﬁrst and then conducting
econometric analyses. The ﬁnal section contains some concluding re-
marks.
11.2 The Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions Wave of the Late 1990s
11.2.1 Preliminaries
Before turning to the factual record, it may be helpful to clarify the terms
used in this chapter. An important distinction is between foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. As the princi-
pal source of data on cross-border M&A used here is the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD’s) annual World In-
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11. This is not to say that every cross-border merger or acquisition in the banking sector
generates enough eﬃciencies that bank customers beneﬁt.
12. This is not say that every cross-border strategic alliance detrimentally aﬀects the wel-
fare of bank customers.vestment Report, I reproduce below UNCTAD’s description of the diﬀer-
ence between cross-border M&A and FDI.
A ﬁrm can undertake FDI in a host country in either one of two ways:
greenﬁeld investment in a new facility or acquiring or merging with an
existing local ﬁrm. The local ﬁrm may be privately or state owned: pri-
vatisations involving foreign investors count as cross border M&As,
which entails a change in the control of the merged or acquired ﬁrm. In
a cross border merger, the assets and operation of the two ﬁrms belong-
ing to two diﬀerent countries are combined to establish a new legal en-
tity. In a cross border acquisition, the control of assets and operations is
transferred from a local to a foreign company, the former becoming an
aﬃliate of the latter. (UNCTAD 2000, 99)
Although this quotation clariﬁes the distinction between investments in
new productive entities and investments in existing entities it would be in-
correct to infer that, in practice, the reported value of cross-border M&A
transactions is always less than the reported amount of FDI. In fact, mea-
sured cross-border M&A received by a nation is taken to be the sum of (a)
foreign investments in existing domestic ﬁrms that result in equity stakes
greater than 10 percent, (b) foreign investments in existing domestic ﬁrms
that result in equity stakes less than 10 percent, and (c) foreign investments
in existing domestic ﬁrms that are paid for using capital or funds raised in
the nation of the acquiring ﬁrm. In contrast, the reported amount of FDI
received by a nation includes (a) and (c), plus the value of overseas invest-
ments paid for by reinvested earnings of foreign ﬁrms already resident in
the nation. Consequently, as UNCTAD (1996) notes,
It is, therefore, possible to witness a large increase in M&As that is not
fully reﬂected in FDI ﬂows . . . [and] . . . movements in FDI ﬂows can
take place independently of movements in M&A. In practice, however,
there is a close relationship between movements in M&As and FDI
ﬂows. (UNCTAD 1996, box I.1).
To  underscore the diﬀerences between measured cross-border M&A
and FDI into industrial countries, table 11.1reports the ratio of the former
to the latter in thirteen OECD nations during 1995 to 1999. In some coun-
tries (Australia, France, Japan, and Spain), the ratio is far from 1—sug-
gesting that recorded cross-border M&A and FDI diﬀer markedly.
In collecting data on cross-border M&A, the source used by UNCTAD
attempts, whenever possible, to establish the location of the “ultimate”
corporate owner of a given ﬁrm, not an “intermediate” owner that may
also be owned by another ﬁrm. This is done by examining newspaper an-
nouncements of actual and proposed transactions complemented by the
use of databases that identify which ﬁrms own other ﬁrms. By locating the
headquarters of an ultimate corporate owner, one can assign a nationality
to the owner. This, of course, sidesteps the fact that a publicly traded com-
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Table 11.1 Ratio of Inward M&A Flows to Inward FDI Flows for 13 OECD Economies
Economy 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Mean ratio
Spain 20.40 22.22 63.91 48.05 56.14 42.14
France 31.81 61.82 76.59 57.25 59.02 57.30
Sweden 65.39 76.19 30.35 56.71 99.42 65.61
The Netherlands 29.52 23.51 131.73 46.44 113.95 69.03
Belgium and Luxembourg 18.62 63.82 78.65 30.41 153.98 69.10
The United States 90.58 80.60 77.46 112.47 84.57 89.14
Canada 124.95 112.48 72.36 75.71 99.07 96.92
Switzerland 166.08 143.18 53.42 71.25 120.54 110.89
Germany 62.34 181.44 106.84 90.00 156.36 119.39
Italy 84.72 77.95 90.86 146.17 225.24 124.99
The United Kingdom 182.24 127.98 119.50 143.10 152.59 145.08
Australia 140.27 213.79 191.33 232.26 192.77 194.09
Japan 1387.18 859.50 96.34 126.00 124.46 518.70
Weighted mean (across 
economies) 84.60 87.16 86.75 96.89 102.75
Coeﬃcient of variation 4.32 2.51 0.47 0.58 0.48
Source: UNCTAD (2000, appendixes).
pany may have shareholders or stockholders who are resident in more than
one country—a wrinkle that is easy (and important) to state but is diﬃcult
to address adequately.
11.2.2 Factual Record
Turning now to the data, using 1987 constant dollars, table 11.2 and ﬁg-
ure 11.1report the extent of cross-border mergers and acquisitions activity
from 1987 to 2000, the peak year of the latest boom.13(In 2001, reports sug-
gest that cross-border M&A fell 40 percent in nominal terms.) As ﬁgure
11.1 makes clear, the recent wave of cross-border M&A accelerated after
1996 and reached a peak of $828 billion in 2000 (which is equivalent to $1.1
trillion dollars in year 2000 dollars). The previous wave of cross-border
M&A, which took place from 1987 to 1990, reached a peak of $135 billion
in 1990—less than one-ﬁfth of the peak in the latest wave. Furthermore,
developing economies played next to no role in the 1980s wave and a mod-
est role in the most recent wave.14 Perhaps for this reason, it might be more
accurate to call the latest wave an international wave, rather than a global
wave, of cross-border M&A.
For further perspective on the growth of cross-border M&A in the
13. For two descriptions of the factual record that include more discussion than is pre-
sented here of mergers and acquisitions in selected sectors, see Kang and Johansson (2000)
and OECD (2001). For a recent account and analysis of foreign mergers and acquisitions in
the United States, see Feliciano and Lipsey (2002).
14. Having said that, see Mody and Negishi (2000) for an account of the growing role of















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.1990s, see ﬁgure 11.2. This shows that the real growth of cross-border
M&A dwarfs that of world GDP and of world merchandise trade, the lat-
ter of which almost doubled in real terms in the 1990s. In ﬁgure 11.2, I de-
ﬂated current values of total cross-border M&A by the same gross domes-
tic product (GDP) deﬂator that I used to compute real world GDP—a
procedure which can be objected to on the grounds that stock markets
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Fig. 11.1 The latest wave of cross-border M&A (1997–2000) is much larger than
its predecessor (1987–1990)
Fig. 11.2 The real increase in cross-border M&A throughout the 1990s dwarfs that
of world trade and GDPsoared in the 1990s, raising the possibility that the price of ﬁnancial capi-
tal has grown more quickly than the GDP deﬂator. To examine this matter
further, I deﬂated country-by-country values of nominal inward cross-
border M&A by the changes in the value of each country’s major stock-
market index,15and normalized the amount of cross-border M&A received
in 1990 at 100. (The year 1990 was the peak of the wave of cross-border
M&A that started in the late 1980s.) Figure 11.3 reports this new calcula-
tion of the real value of cross-border M&A received by the ten industrial-
ized economies throughout the 1990s. In all but two economies, real in-
ward M&A is much lower in 1990 than in 2000, conﬁrming that, for the
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15. For nine of the ten industrialized economies, choosing the major stock-market index
was straightforward. For the United States, however, one could choose either the Standard &
Poor’s (S&P) 500 index or the Dow Jones Industrial Index. I chose the latter index, but note
that both indexes rose by similar percentages throughout the 1990s.
A
B
Fig. 11.3 Comparing inward M&A across booms: A, Economies with relatively
moderate increases; B, Economies with large increasesmajor markets in the world economy, the latest cross-border M&A wave
was on a much larger scale than its predecessor in the 1980s.
Having said that, the growth of cross-border M&A is from a relatively
small base and, when the level of cross-border M&A that a nation received
in the late 1990s is compared to its stock market’s capitalization, the
amount of assets acquired by foreign ﬁrms tends to be quite small (see table
11.3). Only the smaller—and relatively more open—industrial economies
saw the total value of foreign mergers and acquisitions exceed 5 percent
of their total stock-market capitalizations. For the G7 leading industrial
economies, the inﬂows of cross-border M&A are even smaller relative to
the size of their stock markets. The image of aggressive foreign executives
snapping up large shares of productive domestic assets conjured up during
the contentious merger of Vodafone and Mannesmann AG in 2000, for ex-
ample, ﬁnds little support in the data.
Figures 11.4 and 11.5 provide further indications of the broader partici-
pation in the latest wave of cross-border M&A, compared to its predeces-
sor in the 1980s. The latter was essentially an American and British aﬀair,
with some French ﬁrms making acquisitions towards the end of the boom
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Table 11.3 Total Value of Annual Cross-Border M&A Deals as a Percentage of
Stock-Market Capitalization
1980s Wave 1990s Wave
Economy 1988 1989 1990 Mean 1997 1996 1999 Mean
Luxembourg 0.01 0.00 5.08 1.70 10.30 0.10 20.48 10.29
Sweden 0.19 1.55 4.58 2.11 1.22 3.98 15.99 7.06
Belgium 1.35 1.08 6.83 3.08 4.34 2.79 13.51 6.88
Norway 1.67 2.38 2.56 2.20 4.00 2.10 13.66 6.59
New Zealand 10.03 5.00 41.92 18.98 4.41 9.28 5.64 6.44
Austria 2.85 0.14 1.65 1.55 6.32 10.41 1.15 5.96
The Netherlands 1.04 2.51 1.24 1.60 4.06 3.21 5.61 4.30
Australia 3.17 3.34 2.34 2.95 5.00 4.48 2.80 4.10
The United Kingdom 2.58 3.21 3.43 3.07 1.99 3.84 4.52 3.45
Denmark 0.72 0.56 1.27 0.85 0.60 3.85 4.38 2.94
Canada 3.61 3.57 2.37 3.19 1.50 3.02 2.99 2.50
France 1.23 0.91 2.60 1.58 2.63 1.70 1.62 1.98
Germany 0.52 1.18 1.75 1.15 1.44 1.74 2.76 1.98
Finland 0.27 0.75 0.22 0.41 1.00 3.09 0.90 1.67
Spain 0.79 1.30 3.44 1.84 1.40 1.42 1.35 1.39
The United States 2.29 1.96 1.79 2.01 0.72 1.56 1.51 1.26
Italy 2.29 1.77 1.46 1.84 0.98 0.79 1.54 1.10
Switzerland 1.67 0.57 2.85 1.70 0.62 0.78 0.59 0.66
Portugal 0.15 7.23 2.31 3.23 0.22 0.68 0.32 0.41
Japan 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.16 0.36 0.22
Greece 0.51 0.00 0.76 0.42 0.29 0.03 0.09 0.14
Note: Countries in bold are members of the Group of Seven Industrialized Nations (G7).422 Simon J. Evenett
Fig. 11.5 The latest M&A wave involved more OECD nations
Fig. 11.4 Cumulative distribution of cross-border M&A in 1987–1990 and
1997–2000
(principally in 1990). In contrast, the current wave involved considerable
transactions by German, French, Spanish, and Nordic ﬁrms that joined the
long standing Anglo-American interest in cross-border M&A. Figure 11.5
compares the cumulative distribution of cross-border M&A across OECD
nations in both waves, conﬁrming the less skewed nature of the latest wave.
Another critical feature of the latest cross-border M&A wave is the im-
portant role played by so-called megadeals, those transactions whose value
exceeded one billion U.S. dollars. The number of such deals nearly qua-
drupled from 1996 to 2000 (see ﬁg. 11.6), and the (constant dollar) value
of such transactions more than quadrupled (see ﬁg. 11.7). In appendix
table 11A.1, I have listed the megadeals that were announced in 2000.Fig. 11.6 The growing number of billion-dollar-plus M&A deals
Fig. 11.7 Mega deals drove the latest wave of cross-border M&AIt is evident that the majority of such deals involved the service sector, no-
tably the ﬁnancial and telecommunications sectors. Few manufacturing
ﬁrms can be found on this list, a point I shall return to below.
An examination of the sectoral breakdown of cross-border M&A dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s waves is revealing too (see table 11.4 and ﬁg.
11.8). One striking ﬁnding is the relatively smaller importance of manu-
facturing cross-border M&A in the late 1990s, accounting for only 35.1
percent of the total value of such transactions. In the previous wave, such
transactions accounted for 62.2 percent of the total. What is more, just
424 Simon J. Evenett





Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and ﬁshing 0.72 0.38
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 4.32 1.04
Manufacturing 62.24 35.11
Food, beverages, and tobacco 8.16 4.28
Textiles, clothing, and leather 0.95 0.41
Wood and wood products 3.93 1.72
Publishing, printing, and reproduction of 
recorded media 5.89 1.11
Coke, petroleum, and nuclear fuel 9.38 5.33
Chemicals and chemical products 12.17 6.70
Rubber and plastic products 2.03 0.48
Nonmetallic mineral products 2.30 1.39
Metal and metal products 2.86 1.67
Machinery and equipment 1.75 1.69
Electrical and electronic equipment 8.14 5.44
Precision instruments 2.20 1.21
Motor vehicles and other transport 
equipment 1.94 3.60
Other manufacturing 0.53 0.11
Tertiary 32.72 63.46
Electric, gas, and water 0.36 5.44
Construction 0.46 0.38
Trade 8.08 5.07
Hotels and restaurants 3.77 0.82
Transport, storage, and communications 1.84 21.94
Finance 11.03 16.19
Business services 4.39 9.44
Public administration and defence 0.00 0.08
Education 0.00 0.02
Health and social services 0.17 0.20
Community, social- and personal-service 
activities 2.62 3.87
Other services 0.01 0.01
Unknown 0.00 0.00The Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions Wave of the Late 1990s 425
three service sectors (transport, storage, and communications; ﬁnance;
and business services) account for just under one-half of total cross-border
M&A in the late 1990s.
11.2.3 Policy Regimes Facing Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions
Much has been made in the literature and in the reports of international
organizations16 of the falling barriers to greenﬁeld FDI during the 1990s.
A
B
Fig. 11.8 Manufacturing dominated the 1987–1990 wave but services dominated
the 1997–2000 wave: A, 1987–1990; B, 1997–2000
16. See, for example, World Bank (2000) and the annual World Investment Reports pub-
lished by UNCTAD (various years).The UNCTAD goes so far as to tally up, on an annual basis, the number of
economies that have relaxed or tightened their FDI regimes.17 However, in
industrialized economies (and in some developing economies too), cross-
border mergers and acquisitions are typically inﬂuenced by two diﬀerent
policy regimes: merger-review policies (which are described in some detail
below) and sectoral regulations. The latter can involve reviews of M&A
deals (both domestic and cross-border) that occur within a given sector.
Regulators in ﬁnancial services, banking, telecommunications, and air
transportation have been active in the 1990s reviewing proposals to merge
or acquire ﬁrms. What is more, some jurisdictions allow for M&As in some
sectors to be reviewed both by the relevant sectoral regulator and by the na-
tional competition-enforcement agency.18 This raises the question of the
extent to which observed levels of cross-border M&A are aﬀected by the
potential for multiple oﬃcial reviews within the same jurisdiction.
In contrast to policies toward greenﬁeld FDI, it is quite possible that,
as a general proposition, policies toward M&As have become more strin-
gent throughout the 1990s. For starters, the number of jurisdictions with
merger-review regimes rose sharply in the 1990s (see ﬁg. 11.9).19According
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17. See UNCTAD’s (various years) annual World Investment Reports for details.
18. For examples, see the case studies in Evenett, Lehmann, and Steil (2000).
19. Figure 11.9 reports not only the total number of merger review laws enacted since 1970,
but also the total number of such laws requiring notiﬁcation of proposed mergers and acqui-
sitions before deals are completed. Among legal practitioners and scholars, the latter type of
merger-review regime is, by and large, regarded as the most stringent form of merger-review
law (see ICPAC 2000 for a statement of what might be called conventional legal wisdom in this
regard). See, also, Evenett (2002), which conﬁrms that, of the three main types of merger-
review laws, those requiring mandatory prenotiﬁcation curtail cross-border M&A the most.
In the light of these remarks, it is noteworthy that a growing proportion of the merger-review
Fig. 11.9 The spread of merger-review laws 1970–2000to White and Case (2001), a publication of an international law ﬁrm that
conducts an annual survey of merger enforcement around the world, sixty-
ﬁve economies had merger review laws in 2000 (plus the European Com-
mission’s supranational merger-enforcement regime). Thirty of these
merger-review laws have been enacted since 1990. It is also noteworthy that
merger-review laws are a relatively new phenomenon in some industrial
economies; in other words, the spread in the last twenty years is not just a
phenomenon found in developing countries. For instance, the European
Commission’s merger regulation only came into force in 1990, Italy’s
merger-review regime was enacted in 1990, Denmark’s and the Nether-
lands’ in 1997, and France’s antitrust authority only celebrated its ﬁfteenth
birthday in 2002. Finally, these remarks suggest that, when studying cross-
border ﬂows associated with corporate investments abroad, it is important
to locate which policy regime or regimes has the greatest bearing on the
ﬂows being examined. In many cases, measures of (or proxies for) the
strength of the policy regime towards greenﬁeld investments may provide
a misleading guide to the strength of the merger-review regime or of the
sectoral regulatory regime.
11.2.4 Commentary and Related Literature
The observed change in the sectoral composition of cross-border M&A
reﬂects a number of factors. First, lower trade barriers and more intense
competition in world markets for manufactures are likely to reduce the
incentive to engage in cross-border M&A in order to accumulate market
power or to jump tariﬀs. Indeed, any increments in market power are likely
to result in greater supplies from competitors located at home and abroad.
This suggests the following hypothesis: In those industries where interna-
tional competition is ﬁercest, M&A is more likely to be motivated by cost-
cutting rationales. Second, the increase in service-sector M&A reﬂects
deregulation, privatization, and the relaxation on restrictions on foreign
ownership in many industrial economies. Although such reforms began in
the 1980s in a few industrial economies (notably Britain, New Zealand,
and the United States), in many other countries they were not implemented
on a wider scale until the 1990s. This is not to say that all the major service
sectors are deregulated, but rather that the pace of deregulation picked up
in the 1990s and that this presented opportunities for foreign investors. In
many continental-European economies, the pace gathered in response to
the Single Market Programme and the liberalization initiatives that en-
sued.
Although the corporate-ﬁnance literature on the causes and ﬁnancial
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laws enacted in the 1980s and 1990s are of the mandatory prenotiﬁcation type (see ﬁg. 11.9).
This is further evidence in favor of the proposition that the worldwide policy regime toward
M&A has become stricter over time. (It may well be the case that the policy regimes towards
M&A in individual countries have been relaxed throughout the 1990s.)eﬀects of mergers and acquisitions is quite voluminous, there are relatively
few papers on the determinants and consequences of cross-border M&A20
and on economic analyses of the policy regimes governing such cross-
border transactions.21 Black (2000a,b) describes a number of political and
economic factors that, in his opinion, account for the recent surge in cross-
border M&A. He points to the “breakdown of the old antitakeover coali-
tion” (Black 2000a, 10). Unions have weakened, and managers own more
stock options, which ties their remuneration more closely to corporate per-
formance—which, he claims, reduces the incentive to defend against the
takeover of a poorly performing ﬁrm. Lower inﬂation and a surging stock
market, it is argued, have reduced the costs of ﬁnancing M&A (although
this explanation surely applies to domestic M&A as well as to cross-border
M&A). Finally, Black notes that there is now less opposition to concen-
trations of wealth and that integrating national markets have encouraged
ﬁrms to aspire to activities on a worldwide scale. Pryor’s (2001) focus, in
contrast, is on documenting the consequences for the United States of the
recent boom in domestic and cross-border M&A. He argues that such
transactions have increased the concentration of manufacturing industries
in the 1990s and, in his opinion, can be expected to continue to do so in the
future.
An econometric approach was taken in Evenett (2002, 2003b). Employ-
ing a gravity-equation approach in both studies, Evenett estimated the
contribution of diﬀerent factors to the value of the American outward
M&A that forty-nine foreign economies received in 1999, including the
eﬀect of national merger-review regimes. In both studies, several nation-
speciﬁc factors are found to be important determinants of cross-border
M&A, including the recipient nation’s gross domestic product, the dis-
tance from the United States, the recipient nation’s corporate-tax rate and
average tariﬀ rate, and whether or not the recipient nation was once a
British colony (and is, therefore, more likely to use English as the language
of business and to share a common law system with the United States).
Evenett (2003b) also found that the presence of merger-review laws tends
to cut in half the amount of American M&A received. This constitutes a
substantial barrier to the international trade in corporate assets and is
especially important given that the 1990s saw more and more developing
economies adopt merger-review laws—in particular, those developing na-
tions that hoped to join the EU at some point in the future.
Evenett (2002) also found that the combined eﬀect of merger enforce-
ment by national authorities in the EU and by the European Commission
curtailed American overseas M&A by the same percentage22 as compa-
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20. This paucity of studies on cross-border M&A is to be contrasted with the voluminous
literature on FDI, which the earlier discussion suggests is a distinct but related phenomenon.
21. There are a number of legal analyses of the policy regimes inﬂuencing cross-border
mergers and acquisitions.
22. In this case, ﬁfty percent.rable non-European merger enforcement agencies. This ﬁnding may be of
interest in the light of the sharp transatlantic dispute over the proposed
merger between General Electric and Honeywell in 2001, in which accu-
sations were made that the European merger authorities discriminated
against proposed American mergers.23
The economic impact of cross-border M&A depends on a number of
considerations that make it unlikely that sweeping claims can be made with
any conﬁdence about the desirability (or otherwise) of such international
trade in corporate assets. By reducing the number of ﬁrms that supply a
market, cross-border M&As may enhance the market power of the surviv-
ing ﬁrms. However, such changes in ownership may also result in the com-
bined entity attaining greater economies of scale and scope, which, in turn,
may beneﬁt consumers in the form of lower prices, a wider range of services
oﬀered, or higher-quality goods and services. One mechanism often-
mentioned is that foreign ﬁrms transfer so-called cutting-edge technol-
ogies and better managerial practices to domestic ﬁrms that they have
merged with or acquired—suggesting that the beneﬁcial eﬀects of mergers
and acquisitions could be greater in the cross-border case compared to a
domestic transaction. However, there are no guarantees that these pro-
competitive aspects of cross-border M&As will necessarily completely
oﬀset any anticompetitive eﬀects of such transactions.24
The strength of each of these considerations is likely to vary from indus-
try to industry. For example, as noted above, those sectors that face ag-
gressive import competition are ceterius paribus less likely to see cross-
border M&A result in higher prices. In sectors such as banking, where
ﬁrms increasingly oﬀer a wide range of ﬁnancial products to customers,
gains are likely to occur when mergers take place among ﬁnancial institu-
tions that sell complementary products. Another sector, telecommunica-
tions, has seen rapid technological progress in the 1990s, and cross-border
M&As are often mentioned as one of the conduits by which such innova-
tions are diﬀused across national borders—along with the managerial
practices that are needed to make good the proﬁtable opportunities created
by these technological improvements. In terms of general ﬁndings, there-
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23. Note that this ﬁnding in Evenett (2002) does not speak to the issue as to whether EC
merger enforcement procedures tends to discriminate more against transactions involving
American ﬁrms than transactions involving non-American ﬁrms.
24. One important—and contentious—issue is to what extent ownership changes are
needed to secure the procompetitive beneﬁts of mergers and acquisitions. Direct contracting
and collaborative (or so-called strategic) alliances may provide the means by which a domes-
tic ﬁrm can market a foreign ﬁrm’s range of products, or by which a domestic ﬁrm can expand
its output (potentially reaping economies of scale) by producing goods under contract for a
foreign ﬁrm. This raises the possibility that all the resource-allocation beneﬁts of cross-border
M&As can be obtained by signing interﬁrm agreements that do not involve reducing the num-
ber of suppliers. However, the point need not to be taken too far because transactions-costs
arguments often point to the need for cross-holding of equity to attenuate incentive problems.
Furthermore, members of an interﬁrm alliance or contracting, that starts oﬀ with procom-
petitive eﬀects, may well soon ﬁgure out how to turn their collaboration to price-raising ends.fore, a sector-by-sector evaluation of the eﬀects of cross-border M&A is
probably the most one can ever realistically expect, and, in the next section,
I attempt such an evaluation of the recent consolidation in the banking sys-
tem in thirteen OECD nations.
A ﬁnal point, whose implications tend to be thought through in many
other international economic policy matters but which has, until now, re-
ceived less attention in discussions of international-antitrust matters, is
that cross-border M&A may well have economic eﬀects that spill across na-
tional borders, and that national antitrust or competition authorities tend
to focus only on the eﬀects within their own jurisdictions. Therefore, no
government entity exists to aggregate the eﬀects of a proposed transaction
across all the aﬀected national markets.25This may lead to situations where
a transaction is vetoed in some jurisdictions (where the economic conse-
quences are thought to be adverse), even though there is a positive eﬀect on
net across all the aﬀected markets.
Essentially, the absence of any compensation mechanism between states
implies that multiple national vetoes can lead to suboptimal enforcement
of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. In recent years, a leading an-
titrust American oﬃcial has given attention to the issue of multiple na-
tional vetoes (see Muris 2001), but the importance of the lack of any com-
pensation mechanism for resource misallocation has yet to receive much
attention in legal and economic discourse on merger reviews. Indeed, the
absence of such a mechanism is one of the key characteristics that diﬀer-
entiates the international eﬀects of the national antitrust enforcement from
trade-policy negotiations. In the latter, it has long been understood that
any losses to a nation in one sector are compensated for by concessions in
other sectors by trading partners. Without suggesting that cross-sectoral
trade-oﬀs are the optimal means to conduct multijurisdictional merger re-
views, there is probably some value in thinking through the implications of
compensation mechanisms across merger cases that prevent a proposed
merger or acquisition, whose worldwide total eﬀects are welfare improv-
ing, from being blocked by a single jurisdiction in which it is thought that
the transaction’s eﬀects are adverse.26
11.3 Consolidation of the Banking Systems in Thirteen Industrial Nations
I now turn to an econometric evaluation of the eﬀects of cross-border
mergers and acquisitions in the banking systems of thirteen industrial
economies. When conducting such evaluations, the importance of control-
ling for changes in regulatory structure, for sample composition, and for
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25. Within the EU, for example, the European Commission could play such an aggregating
role. This is not to say that it does play such a role!
26. For more discussion on the potential for resource misallocation in multijurisdictional
merger review, see Evenett (2003c) and Neven and Roller (2001).other determinants of market structure in the banking sector—such as do-
mestic M&As, domestic entry and exit of banking, and the formation
of joint ventures and strategic alliances between banks—will become evi-
dent. But, ﬁrst, I review the facts on banking consolidation as presented in
tables 11.5 and 11.6, which were assembled from a detailed report on bank
consolidation during the 1990s that was published by the Bank of Interna-
tional Settlements (BIS 2001). This report referred to consolidation inthir-
teen OECD nations, namely, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
During the 1990s, these thirteen OECD economies experienced 3,563
mergers and acquisitions that involved a domestic bank and another do-
mestic bank. This domestic consolidation dwarfed in number (and in
value) the amount of cross-border M&A in banks (which totaled 338 trans-
actions worth, in current dollars, approximately $73 billion; see table 11.5).
What is more, many banks engaged in joint ventures and in strategic al-
liances during this period, particularly in the United States, Japan, and
Canada (table 11.6). In short, cross-border M&A was not the only factor
inﬂuencing the concentration and the market structure of these nations’
banking systems.
Research on banking mergers points to a number of rationales for this
observed consolidation. Carow and Kane (2002), for example, point to the
following potential beneﬁts to ﬁrms of such mergers and acquisitions: cost-
based economies of scale, brand-based economies of scale, revenue-based
economies of scale, safety-net-based economies of scale, revenue-based
economies of scope, X-ineﬃciency, market power, and managerial-agency
costs (Carow and Kane 2001, table 1). Dermine (1999), whose analysis
Carow and Kane developed, noted that the following attractions to bank
M&As have been asserted in the literature: ﬁrst, size can bring “defense
based economies of scale,” that is, “achieving size . . . that acts as a defen-
sive measure against takeovers” (Dermine 1999, 16), and, second, the long-
standing “quiet life” hypothesis. Moreover, strategic alliances also can
generate cost eﬃciencies to the extent that alliance partners can reduce any
duplication in distribution networks.
My interest here is in the market power and eﬃciency-related aspects of
bank mergers and acquisitions. In particular, I focus on the eﬀects on one
important observable variable, the interest-rate spread, which is the diﬀer-
ence between the interest rates paid by borrowers and those paid to depos-
itors. Part of that spread will be determined by the costs associated with
collecting deposits, but also by the costs associated with locating and
screening potential borrowers. Another determinant of the spread is mar-
ket power, and this depends on the number of options available to both de-
positors and the borrowers. If potential depositors have few choices as to
where to place their savings, then incumbent banks can oﬀer lower deposit














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1rates which ceterius paribus raises spreads. Likewise, if potential borrow-
ers have few alternatives to seeking funds from the incumbent banks, then
the interest rate paid by the former will be higher, thus raising spreads.
In the absence of eﬃciencies, bank M&As can be expected to raise
spreads as the number of banking options facing depositors and borrowers
declines. Only if there is suﬃcient rivalry between banks after a merger takes
place will any eﬃciencies created by the merger be passed on to consumers
in the form of lower spreads.27 It is an empirical question whether market
power or eﬃciencies dominates. To date, the empirical literature on bank
mergers is mixed on the relative importance of these two factors (see the dis-
cussions in Berger et al. 2000; Calomiris and Karceski 2000; Vives 2001).
To estimate the eﬀects on interest-rate spreads of the changes in the na-
tional banking sectors documented in tables 11.5 and 11.6, I assembled
from BIS (2001) and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(WDI) an unbalanced panel comprising the thirteen nations in the BIS
study. The unbalanced nature of the panel resulted from the fact that in
some countries the ﬁve ﬁrm-concentration ratios in the banking sectors
were not reported in the BIS study for every year from 1990 to 1999. The
BIS study provided annual data on the number of banks in each country,
the number and types of strategic alliances, and the number and types of
M&A.
The dependent variable for this study—the interest-rate spread—was
taken from the WDI CD-ROM. This source deﬁnes the interest spread as
“the interest rate charged by banks on loans to prime customers minus the
interest paid to by commercial or similar banks for demand, time, or sav-
ings deposits” (WDI CD-ROM).28
The mean value of this spread for each economy is reported in table 11.7,
which sorts the economies according to the annual average number of
cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The highest mean spread (6.35 per-
cent) is in Germany and the lowest spread is in Canada (1.34 percent).
Data on three macroeconomic series—GDPs, GDP-price deﬂators, and
stock-market capitalization—used to form control variables (which are de-
scribed later) was also assembled from the WDI. Both GDP growth and
the inﬂation rate are intended to proxy for the stage of the business cycle,
whereas the size of a nation’s stock market is supposed to proxy for the ex-
tent to which ﬁnancial markets can act as an alternative source of ﬁnance
for borrowers and as an alternative destination for personal savings.
The objective of the econometric strategy is to discern—after stripping
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27. For a more sophisticated overview of the causes and consequences of market power in
banking, see Vives (2001, section 3).
28. Some seminar participants have questioned the accuracy of the WDI data on bank
spreads. I checked other available series on bank spreads—speciﬁcally, those from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and the comprehensive DATASTREAM ﬁnancial database—and





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3out the variation created by the business cycle and any competition for
funds created by the stock market and by the impact of regulatory
changes—whether or not interest-rate spreads in the 1990s have been in-
ﬂuenced by the formation of the numerous strategic alliances and the con-
summation of bank M&As. Of special interest is whether or not cross-
border M&A and cross-border strategic alliances have diﬀerent eﬀects
from their domestic counterparts. So that my econometric estimates are
not determined entirely by the boom years of cross-border M&A (1997–
2000), the data set used covers as much of the 1990s as the data sources em-
ployed here would allow.
I proceed from a parsimonious speciﬁcation to richer ones. The ﬁrst
speciﬁcation purges the variation in bank spreads of variation associated
with a set of macroeconomic controls and includes country-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects. The estimation equation is










     ai   b   ln(Mit)   εit,
where
















     b3 ln(SMit)   b4 ln(t)   ...  
and
i   1,..., N, N   13;
t   1990,..., 1999;
ai is a country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect for economy i;
Lit is the prime rate paid to borrowers from banks in economy i in
year t;
Dit is the interest paid to depositors in banks in economy i in year t;
GDP it is the GDP of economy i in year t;
P it is the GDP deﬂator in economy i in year t; and
SMit is the total stock-market capitalization of economy i in year t as a
percentage of GDP it.
The vector Mitincludes the four macroeconomic controls previously out-
lined plus the (six) two-way interaction between these four controls. The
parameter estimates, obtained by confronting speciﬁcation (1) with the
data from my unbalanced panel of thirteen economies, account for 6.43 per-
cent of the within variation, see table 11.8. The estimation procedure used
weighted least squares to take account of any country-speciﬁc (or group-
wise) heteroskedacity.29
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29. Speciﬁcally, the weight applied to each country’s data in a second-stage regression is the
absolute value of the estimate of the standard deviation of the residuals that were recovered
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Speciﬁcations (2) and (3) in table 11.8 include parsimonious controls for
changes in market structure. Speciﬁcation (2) includes the logarithm of
the ﬁve ﬁrm-concentration ratio as an independent variable. Speciﬁcation
(3) goes further and introduces as two additional distinct independent
variables the logarithms of (1 plus) the number of annual strategic alliances
and (1 plus) the number of annual M&As consummated since 1990. Both
speciﬁcations yield the traditional ﬁnding that increases in the concentra-
tion ratio raises interest-rate spreads. Speciﬁcation (3) provides the ﬁrst ev-
idence that strategic alliances appear to raise interest-rate spreads, whereas
M&As tend to have no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on them.
One objection to speciﬁcation (3) is that the observed concentration ra-
tio in a given year may well, in turn, be inﬂuenced by the number of strate-
gic alliances and mergers and acquisitions that have occurred in the past or
are taking place currently. Consequently, in addition to allowing for time-
invariant country-speciﬁc determinants of concentration, I also purged
the variation of the ﬁve ﬁrm-concentration ratio of the observed levels of
strategic alliances and M&As.30 This purged concentration ratio was used
in speciﬁcation (4) instead of the actual concentration ratio in speciﬁcation
(3). The upshot: precious little changes.31
Another objection to speciﬁcations (1) through (4) is that they do not
take into account the entry and exit of domestic banks that is independent
of M&A. Speciﬁcation (5) includes as an independent variable the loga-
rithm of the number of banks in an economy. With this additional explan-
atory variable, the eﬀect of the concentration ratio on interest-rate spreads
still has the correct sign and the parameter estimate on the strategic-
alliance variable remains little changed. Entry of banks is found to depress
spreads, but not in a statistically signiﬁcant manner.
As the BIS data source enables me to diﬀerentiate between domestic and
cross-border strategic alliances and between domestic and cross-border
M&A, I entered them as separate independent variables in speciﬁcation
(6). Interestingly, domestic M&A and domestic strategic alliances are
found to raise spreads, with the estimated parameter on the former 50 per-
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30. Speciﬁcally, in speciﬁcation (4), I regressed the concentration ratio on country-speciﬁc
dummies and the logarithm of 1 plus the total number of strategic alliances and the total
number of mergers and acquisitions. Following standard procedures, the estimate of the
purged concentration ratio is the estimated residual of the regression described above in this
footnote.
31. Note that in speciﬁcations (4) through (7) I purged the concentration ratio of country-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects plus each of the M&A and strategic-alliance variables included in a given
speciﬁcation. Moreover, in speciﬁcations (5) through (7), I also purged the concentration ra-
tio of the logarithm of the number of banks. In speciﬁcation (7), I also purged the concentra-
tion ration of the explanatory power of the dummies picking up changes in bank regulatory
regimes. In each speciﬁcation, the goal of this purging procedure is to identify that compo-
nent of the concentration ratio that cannot be attributed to the changes in national market
structures in the banking sector, to national regulatory changes, or to other national charac-
teristics that do not vary over the years of data in the sample (1990–1999).cent larger than on the latter. In contrast, cross-border M&A does appear
to reduce spreads. However, in speciﬁcation (6) these ﬁndings do not sur-
vive the inclusion of controls for regulatory changes in the thirteen OECD
nations during the 1990s.32 Speciﬁcation (7) includes these controls, and
the parameter on the cross-border M&A variable loses its signiﬁcance.
Nonetheless, the estimated parameters do suggest that domestic consoli-
dation and strategic alliances in the banking system have raised spreads
whereas their cross-border counterparts do not.
The next step was to examine whether these qualitative ﬁndings held up
to changes in sample composition. First, I eliminated each country one at
a time from the sample and reestimated the parameters. The new parame-
ter estimates varied little from the previous. Second, I eliminated the North
American economies (Canada and the United States) from the sample,
again with little eﬀect. Third, I eliminated Japan and Australia from the
sample and found not much changed. This seemingly robust set of regres-
sion ﬁndings was overturned when I split the thirteen nation sample into a
sample comprising of EU members and a sample comprising the rest. Ar-
guably, the former’s banking sectors have been aﬀected by the implemen-
tation of two European Banking Directives (and other measures to en-
hance the integration of European markets). Such considerations may
result in banking consolidation in Europe that has diﬀerent eﬀects than in
other parts of the industrialized world. Tables 11.9and 11.10, which report
the parameters estimated in table 11.8 for the eight-nation EU sample and
the ﬁve-nation non-EU sample, respectively, conﬁrm that diﬀerences do
exist between these samples.
In the EU sample, cross-border strategic alliances are found to increase
spreads. Perhaps such alliances in Europe were formed to frustrate entry
and segment markets, rather than to enhance economies of scale and
scope. Interestingly, where EU banks have gone beyond such alliances and
have actually merged with banks located in another EU member, the evi-
dence suggests that spreads do fall (see speciﬁcation (7), table 11.9). In con-
trast, domestic interbank alliances in EU member states appear to have no
eﬀects on bank spreads—suggesting that any economies reaped are prob-
ably oﬀset by a diminution in competition.
The performance of the speciﬁcations in the non-EU sample is rather
mixed. For sure, with the inclusion of the regulatory controls (in speciﬁca-
tion (7), table 11.10), over half of the variation in the dependent variable
is explained. However, few of the market structure variables—such as the
purged concentration ratio—are found to have had a statistically signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect on interest-rate spreads. This may reﬂect the fact that the de-
grees of freedom in the sample are quite small (less than 30). Even so,
440 Simon J. Evenett




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.outside the EU, cross-border strategic alliances were found to depress in-
terest-rate spreads, suggesting that such corporate agreements generate eﬃ-
ciencies.
The parameter estimates from speciﬁcation (7) in both tables 11.9 and
11.10 can be used to quantify the total eﬀect of the observed domestic and
cross-border consolidation in the banking sectors that occurred in the
1990s, as well as the total eﬀect of the formation of strategic alliances. Table
11.11 reports country-by-country the point estimates of the total eﬀect on
interest-rate spreads of the domestic and cross-border banking changes
observed throughout the 1990s. In every non-EU country considered here,
the combined eﬀect of the domestic banking changes was to raise spreads,
but this was oﬀset by the beneﬁcial eﬀects created by cross-border strate-
gic alliances and M&A. In each EU economy, the net eﬀect of domestic
banking changes on spreads is almost zero and is dominated by the spread-
increasing eﬀects of cross-border strategic alliances. Indeed, had those
cross-border strategic alliances not occurred in the 1990s, bank spreads (as
measured by the dependent variable) in each EU country considered here
would have been at least two whole percentage points lower in 1999. In
contrast, in the ﬁve non-EU economies, cross-border strategic alliances
and mergers have helped reduce spreads by between 1.3 and 3.0 percent-
age points.
These ﬁndings suggest that interbank agreements and consolidation in
the 1990s had important eﬀects on interest rates and, therefore, on the wel-
fare of lenders or borrowers. What is doubtful, however, is that sweeping
statements about the eﬀects of cross-border interbank agreements can be
made with any conﬁdence. Indeed, the emphasis in much commentary on
globalization regarding the role of cross-border M&A is somewhat mis-
placed at least in banking, since it appears that the consequences of cross-
border strategic alliances are a more important part of the story.
11.4 Concluding Remarks
The cross-border mergers and acquisitions wave of the 1990s was on a
diﬀerent scale than its predecessor in the late 1990s: It included more ﬁrms
from more countries; saw a greater number of transactions, many of which
were megadeals; and was dominated by service-sector transactions. In
fact, three sectors (namely, transportation and communication, ﬁnance,
and business services) accounted for just under half of the value of all
M&A from 1997 to 2000. An evaluation of this recent cross-border merg-
ers and acquisitions wave is, thus, in large part an evaluation of its eﬀects
on these three sectors. What is more, in each case there are good reasons
for suspecting that cross-border M&A was not the only major change in
their market structures in the 1990s. The telecommunications sector saw
much deregulation and technological advances, as did business services. In








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)banking, whose consolidation was studied in more detail in this chapter,
strategic alliances and domestic M&As were consummated in large num-
bers in the 1990s. Correcting for these other developments was found to be
important when accurately gauging the eﬀect of cross-border mergers and
acquisitions in the banking sector.
My empirical analysis of thirteen OECD economies’ banking sectors
points to a discernable impact of openness to foreign banking activities
on bank spreads. In eight EU economies, the beneﬁcial consequences of
cross-border M&As was more than oﬀset by the deleterious impact of
cross-border strategic alliances. In contrast, the net eﬀect of openness to
foreign banking activities has been to beneﬁt customers in non-European
industrialized economies.
This chapter speaks to a number of themes discussed throughout this
book. First, by documenting the factual record on cross-border mergers
and acquisitions, a better sense of the scale of this phenomenon emerged.
Facts replace assertions. For sure, cross-border mergers and acquisitions in
the late 1990s were greater than in the late 1980s. However, the former still
only represent a small fraction of the stock-market capitalizations of all
but the smallest industrialized economies. Indeed, in almost every indus-
trial country, foreigners are hardly snapping up domestic assets at a rate
that some might ﬁnd alarming.
The second important ﬁnding of this chapter relates to the concern that
changes in the global economy in recent years have sought to reinforce the
market power of corporations. The sectoral study of banking presented
here points to the importance of correctly identifying all of the changes in
a given sector’s structure and its regulations before drawing any inferences
about the eﬀects of consolidation on customers. In the EU banking sector,
the evidence suggests that cross-border M&As have actually beneﬁted
bank customers rather than harming them. In contrast, cross-border stra-
tegic alliances have probably hurt customers in the EU, suggesting that
not all cross-border corporate acts have the same eﬀects. More nuance is
clearly needed in policy debates so that cross-border interﬁrm measures
are not automatically branded as bad or anticonsumer.
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Comment Rod Falvey
The success of multilateral trade negotiations in reducing barriers to trade
and investment ﬂows, and the extensive programs of deregulation and pri-
vatization that have taken place in many countries, have opened up their
domestic markets to greater competition from foreign ﬁrms. In traded-
goods markets this competition can come through increased ﬂows of prod-
ucts across borders. For nontraded goods it comes from the establishment
of foreign-owned suppliers, through greenﬁeld FDI or cross-border merg-
ers and acquisitions (CBMA).
This chapter investigates the CBMA wave of the late 1990s. Section 11.2
describes this wave in some detail. This material provides us with a useful
picture of the characteristics and magnitudes of the CBMA wave of the
1990s, both in absolute terms and relative to the smaller wave that occurred
in the previous decade. Two points stand out: the relative importance of
“mega deals” (those involving assets over $1 billion), and the concentra-
tion in a small number of service sectors, which are “pretty much immune
to import competition.”
I have two comments on this part of the paper, both concerned with the
role and measurement of regulatory policies. The author observes that, in
contrast to the general liberalization of policies toward greenﬁeld FDI,
national policies toward mergers and acquisitions (both within and across
borders) may have become more stringent throughout the 1990s. The spe-
ciﬁc point made is that there has been an increase in the number of juris-
dictions (including both developed and developing countries) with merger
review requirements. Although the two are not inconsistent, this claim
does sit rather awkwardly with the evidence on the magnitude of this
merger wave, and appears to deserve further investigation. Controls for
regulatory changes are included in the econometric analysis in section
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Rod Falvey is the Leverhulme Professor of International Economics at the University of
Nottingham.11.3, and appear to have signiﬁcant eﬀects, but it is not clear whether this
evidence indicates that regulators have become less lenient.
The author also comments that CBMAs may have economic eﬀects that
spill across national boundaries and that will not be taken into account
by regulators. Thus, a CBMA may be vetoed in some jurisdictions even
though its net global eﬀects are positive. Of course, the same can be true of
within-border MAs, whose economic eﬀects can also extend across inter-
national boundaries. One might be concerned that a merger toward mo-
nopoly is more likely to be approved by national regulators in cases where
exports are signiﬁcant. Mergers and acquisitions can generate terms-of-
trade eﬀects which are gains for some jurisdictions, but which net out at the
global level. The case for international cooperation may be stronger than
is claimed.
Section 11.3 then undertakes an econometric investigation of whether
CBMAs in the banking sector have resulted in greater or smaller interest
rate spreads in thirteen OECD countries. This analysis raises a number of
interesting issues.
First, the underlying argument is that the output of banks is ﬁnancial in-
termediation, and that the interest rate spread is the “price” of such inter-
mediation. Unless the diversity of spreads across nations (as shown in table
11.7) can be argued to reﬂect diﬀerences in other charges (e.g., ﬁxed fees
and transactions charges) for ﬁnancial intermediation across jurisdictions,
this seems to provide strong evidence that these national markets are far
from internationally integrated.
Second, the summary statistics in table 11.7 (particularly those relating
to the number of banks and the ﬁve-ﬁrm concentration ratios) suggest that
it is very unlikely that all banks are oﬀering the same range of ﬁnancial
intermediation services. This heterogeneity may help to explain the limited
explanatory power of the model.
Third, both the summary data in tables 11.5 and 11.6 and the econo-
metric results suggest that (a) mergers and acquisitions and (b) joint ven-
tures and strategic alliances (JVSAs) perform rather diﬀerent roles in the
banking sector. While within-border mergers and acquisitions are far more
common than CBMAs, for nine of the countries cross-border JVSAs are
the more common. It would be useful to know more about the similarities
and diﬀerences between these linkages, particularly since the econometric
results indicate that JVSAs tend to raise the interest rate spread. Are
JVSAs allowing banking ﬁrms to circumvent regulatory controls? In par-
ticular, can ﬁrms substitute some form of JVSA, where they suspect a
merger or acquisition would not be approved?
Fourth, the author notes that mergers and acquisitions have two po-
tentially opposing inﬂuences on the interest rate spread in general: they
reduce the number of competitors (the “market power” eﬀect) and (may)
increase average eﬃciency. That CBMAs will reduce the number of com-
468 Simon J. Evenettpetitors seems relatively straightforward for traded goods, but is less clear
cut for nontraded goods and services, where the CBMA could signal the
entry of an eﬃcient foreign competitor. In common with the rest of the
empirical literature, the econometric analysis uses a number of variables
to explain the interest rate spread. Unfortunately, the links between these
variables and the two eﬀects are not always clear cut. Perhaps a simple
Cournot model might clarify the issues. Let s denote the interest rate
spread, and suppose the demand for ﬁnancial intermediation can be rep-
resented by a simple linear function d D– s. There are nbanks, and bank
j has constant unit cost cj. Then the equilibrium spread is se   (D   nc  )/
(n   1), where c    (∑n
j 1cj/n) is the average unit cost. The macroeconomic
controls would then work through D. In general, we would expect merg-
ers and acquisitions to reduce both n and c  . The former would raise the
equilibrium spread, but the latter would reduce it. Since the regression
equations control for the number of ﬁrms, the merger and acquisition
variables should be capturing the eﬀect on “average eﬃciency.” The evi-
dence suggests that CBMAs into the European Union (EU) have in-
creased average eﬃciency. There is no evidence that the corresponding
CBMAs outside the EU have changed average eﬃciency at all. One can
also use this model to solve for the ﬁve-ﬁrm concentration ratio, which











  c   5)
  ,
where c  5is the average unit cost of the ﬁve largest (i.e., most eﬃcient) ﬁrms.
The value of this variable will also be aﬀected by mergers and acquisitions
but not in any straightforward fashion.
Finally, although this point should be fairly obvious, when the author
uses the estimated parameters to quantify the eﬀects of mergers and ac-
quisitions and of strategic alliances on interest rate spreads, readers should
recall that some of these calculations are based on parameters estimated
with very limited precision.
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